

WEAK BORDER MANAGEMENT AND BANDITRY IN THE NORTHWEST REGION NIGERIA

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Abstracts

Strong border management in Nigeria's Northwest shows critical weaknesses through the continuous growth of banditry in the area. This study traces the links between deficient border management systems through border weak points and rising criminal offenses by showing how border weaknesses together with inadequate monitoring and corruption and inadequate institutional response create spaces for border criminals. Using both qualitative and quantitative data, the study utilized tables, figures and content analysis to demonstrate how unregulated borders allow weapons and illegal goods to move freely with armed groups which leads to escalated violence and economic turmoil and threatened national security. Research demonstrates that banditry spreads because border security infrastructure remains inadequate and technological assets are insufficient along with weak interactions between border agencies and their respective communities. The study maintains that banditry control efforts will fail to bear substantial results unless government institutions conduct far-reaching reforms which include better monitoring techniques and strengthened guardian networks linking authorities across states along with strong coordination between different agencies and skilled development of public institutions for role fulfillment. The document supports border security through three-step solutions that merge technological progress with regional defense alliances and community-centered development to tackle border insecurity bases.

Keywords: Border, Management, Banditry, Insecurity, Development

Introduction

Since gaining independence in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have witnessed violence and instability due to a leadership deficit (Ezeibe, 2009). In Nigeria, there has been a social challenge since the country gained its civil rule in 1999. The Nigerian state has been exposed to attacks by Boko Haram terrorists, armed banditry, and kidnapping within the last two decades (Ezeibe, 2020; Ezeani et al, 2021). Ethnic conflicts, election violence, pastoralists-farmers conflicts, armed banditry, and kidnapping are propelled by multifaceted factors (Ezeibe and Eze, 2012; Lenshie et al., 2020; Ezeani et al, 2021). Abraham et al. (2024) lamented that the threats faced by Nigeria surpassed those of its African counterparts. These factors are linked to porous borders maximized by all forms of illegality.

Nigeria's porous border enhanced the illegitimate migration of people who come from neighboring countries like the Republic of Niger, Chad, and the Republic of Benin (Edet & Chinazaekpere, 2021). Religious extremism contributed to the porosity of the national border, creating broad security problems and criminal activity (Udosen & Uwak, 2021). Nigeria finds it difficult to mitigate the spread of arms and ammunition acquisition by bandits and kidnapers owing to this phenomenon (Usman & Singh, 2021). Udosen and Uwak (2021) stated that armed banditry has developed into a profound and complex national security issue for the country.

The bandit activity in Nigeria developed into a crime operation worth millions of naira, and researchers studied it through a historical timeline (Chris et al., 2021). Banditry occurs through the collective formation of armed groups to attack official state institutions, social enterprises, or individual persons, where bandit activity equals taking part in these strikes (Agu & Ugada, 2024). The problem of banditry remains uncontrolled in the way that it has evolved into an important aspect of society throughout North West Nigeria (Abraham et al., 2024). The

geographic region of North West stands on the boundary of the Sahel and now functions as the main center of active banditry activities. Research records demonstrate approximately 100 years of banditry history showing increased frequency when governments lose control or vacant power positions (Osasona, 2023b).

Market analysts suggest the rising crime issue stems from criminal groups entering the country. The alarming series of phenomena, which includes cattle rustling, killings, kidnapping, raping, and arson (Abraham et al., 2024), has driven the recent surge in armed banditry that now poses the greatest national security threat to Nigeria (Brenner, 2021; Campbell, 2020).

Literature Review

Border security and its connection with internal instability have received significant academic interest. The authors of Eselebor and Kehinde (2020) have given an argument that the porous borders of Nigeria create a continuous threat to national security, and that the security and well-being of any nation are inherently defined by the state of its borders, and that border control is the key to the existence of peace and stability.

Specifically, considering the economic crime category, Omotuyi (2024) studied oil smuggling and border control in Nigeria and concluded that transboundary smuggling remains despite the limits on the border, suggesting that border policing is profoundly flawed. Of particular importance was that the study discovered that the only monitoring strategies that give results are those that break the links of smuggling networks with compromised border officials at crossing points. The article by Agbebaku and Uwa (2022) is an assessment of border security related to the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement, and its findings confirmed that this initiative has created more security issues than facilitated trade in the region, which has undermined West African security instead of improving it. The Nigeria Immigration Service

(2019) also recognized that border security and migration management have now become a characteristic feature of socio-political and economic phenomena in the world.

In opposition to the alarmist views, it was discovered by the African Development Bank (2016) that the free movement does not necessarily increase the level of security threats as compared to those caused by resident citizens in Rwanda, Seychelles, and Mauritius for example. This was strengthened by Opanike, Aduloju, and Adenipekun (2015), who stated that the advantages of the cross-border movement usually supersede the security threats, but transboundary criminal activity is a global issue.

Regarding the structural conditions that facilitated banditry, Taylor (2016) cited uncontrolled territories and weak states as the leading facilitators of the illicit actor network. Chris et al. (2021) conducted both historical and descriptive studies on the origins of banditry and related it to poverty, corruption, political pressure, terrorism, the lack of the death penalty, and the change in values. Cayli Messina (2021) also noted that bandits and militants thrive in the environment of weakened social justice, political stability, and economic prosperity, and Kitabu (2022) specifically related banditry to unemployment, executive injustice, exploitation of youth, porous borders, and unmotivated security agents.

Moreover, past research has been carried out on the impacts of unemployment, poverty, bad governance, corruption, and the weak judiciary system on insecurity (Ezeibe and Nwagwu, 2009; Oguonu and Ezeibe, 2014; Nwagwu, 2014; Nwangwu and Ezeibe, 2019) as well as the impact of exclusionary politics on insecurity in Nigeria (Oguonu and Ezeibe, 2016). According to Lenshie (2026), artisanal gold mining in northwest Nigeria has been on the rise, and, despite generating income for poor rural communities, it has led to banditry and criminal activities. He found out that governance failures are used to facilitate the proliferation of banditry to operate with impunity and dominate mining camps.

Speaking of the Northwest in particular, the African Development Bank (2015)

observed that the area accommodates the greatest transhumant pastoralist route in West Africa and the Sahel, with thousands of Fulan herdsmen driving across identified migration pathways every year, which makes security management a challenging issue. Ojewale (2023) reported that bandits have also established themselves in areas of forests that are inaccessible to the state, and security infiltration is very hard. Barnett and Rufai (2021) related the growth of small arms and light weapons, which was enhanced by the fall of Libya in 2011, to the increased threat in rural regions of the region.

Regarding the origins and development of banditry, Anka (2017) and Agu and Ugada (2024) observed the development of Northwest banditry due to centuries of farmer-herder conflicts, and the development of organised activities by 2009 and a sharp increase in 2011 in the wake of the elections. Rufa (2018; 2021) added historical context, citing a reported bandit raid on a trade caravan as far back as 1901, and tracing modern rural banditry in Zamfara to around 2011, when a localised conflict escalated into a regional one. Historical actors like the Asebenawa, Tuaregs, Fulani, and Gobirawa were declared as some of the greatest perpetrators of cross-border crime during the colonial era in British and French territories.

In theory, Okoli and Okpaleke (2014) and Chris et al. (2021) characterized banditry as armed robbery, kidnapping, cattle rustling, village attacks with an economic or political motive, and supported by the use of force and intimidation. Omakoji, Igoli, and Mbah (2024) explained it as systematised violent criminality directed at communities in the form of raids, killings, rape, and kidnapping, whereas Uche and Iwuamadi (2018) considered it politically oriented, viewing banditry as an armed group activity that has materialistic and political goals. James (2023) captured the rise in cattle rustling and banditry as primary security issues over the last twenty years, and Fuoli (2024), on the framework of Eric Hobsbawm, placed banditry in the larger context of pre-political societies across the world since the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries. Ojo et al. (2023) also warned that Northwest banditry is more than mere pastoralist insurgency, being a multifaceted phenomenon with a multiplicity of causes, actors, and dimensions that require a more sophisticated analytical prism.

Although the Federal Government of Nigeria has spent tremendous sums of money purchasing weapons to curtail these, it still strives (Ezeani and Ezeibe, 2011). Dissatisfied with efforts, Lenshie et al (2024) lamented that the weakness of the concerned state institutions has undermined the operations of the military, reversing the strategic intelligence to the terrorists, misappropriation of arms purchase funds, sabotage, and deplorable welfare standards of the combatants, among others. Ezeibe et al. (2022) claim that the mutual respect of the working patterns of the military and the international nongovernmental organizations is significant to enhance their relationship and create long-term initiatives to prevent and counter violent extremism in Nigeria and other countries.

Gap in Literature

Experts have refrained from thoroughly exploring the exact impact of weak border management on the entry of weapons and bandit movement between countries as well as security breakdowns in international cooperation. Current research fails to demonstrate a sufficient direct connection between inadequate border control systems and bandit operations, along with their persistent nature in the northwestern region. Security outcomes at borders remain under-examined due to the lack of research about their relationship to regional policies and international collaboration, along with local community border interactions.

Theoretical Framework

The study adopted the Failed State approach to describe how banditry, cattle rustling, and kidnapping have been sustained in Northwest Nigeria, and that weak border control is symptomatic of state weakness. This theory states that a state is susceptible to insecurity when its ability to regulate the legitimate use of force, protect its territoriality, and deliver key

services to the people is compromised (Rotberg, 2010). The porous borders of the country with the neighboring states, including Niger and Chad, the presence of extensive uncontrollable forest lands, low enforcement of the law, and corruption among the border guards have provided a favorable environment in which bandit groups can thrive and multiply in the Nigerian context (Okoli and Ugwu 2019).

The analysis also indicates that these porous boundaries are being used by bandits to transport arms, cattle stolen, and kidnapped victims to cross boundaries with little opposition, especially in such states as Zamfara, Katsina, and Sokoto. They are also recruited, sheltered, and supported by cross-border ethnic networks (Amnesty International, 2020). In line with the Failed State theory, failure to control its borders by Nigeria is a key indicator of the weakness of a state. This is enhanced by the marginalization and underdevelopment of border communities, making them more vulnerable to victimization and cooperation with bandits (Iyekekpolo, 2020). In general, the theory highlights that the issue of banditry cannot be solved by merely enhancing border security, but these measures must be accompanied by a wider governance reform, regionalization, and socio-economic growth.

Methodology

The adopted documentary approach for data gathering, which presupposes the systematic utilization of written sources of information, including official documents, policy papers, scholarly sources, archives, reports, and other secondary sources. This is an appropriate approach to use in research that aims at analyzing past trends, institutional change, or policy systems because the researcher can obtain dense, non-reactive data that has already been generated in particular circumstances. Through the use of documented evidence, the study has guaranteed extensive coverage of information over time; it reduces the limitations of using primary data collection methods, such as time constraints and bias in respondents.

Using both qualitative and quantitative data, the study utilized tables, figures and content analysis to demonstrate how unregulated borders allow weapons and illegal goods to move freely with armed groups which leads to escalated violence and economic turmoil and threatened national security. This method allows the researcher to interpret and classify textual information in a systematic way. In this approach, the pertinent documents were meticulously examined, coded, and systematized under themes and patterns that are in tandem with the research goals. The content analysis helps identify recurrent ideas and relationships and underlying meanings of the data, and thus provides a structured and objective foundation on which conclusions can be made. The method will increase the reliability and validity of the results because it will be possible to consistently and transparently study documentary evidence.

Discussion of Findings

The state of Northwest Nigeria, including the states of Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kebbi, Jigawa, Sokoto, and Zamfara, has been engulfed in one of the worst security crises in the history of the modern African world. The banditry is creating the worst humanitarian crisis in decades, and it is the largest security threat to rural populations in the border areas in northwest Nigeria and southwest Niger (Ojewale, 2024). The results of this paper are largely consistent with the literature, as they prove the fact that weak border management is one of the key facilitators of banditry in Northwest Nigeria. Okorie et al. (2023) set the border between Nigeria and Niger as unmarked, at least in the areas of Jibia in Katsina, Illela in Sokoto, and Ruwawuri and Kamba in Kebbi, and the residents of communities such as Kongolom identified about 13 unchecked points of entry through agricultural lands. This porosity of structure directly justifies the observation by Nsiegebe and Gabriel (2024) that porous northwestern borders perpetuate banditry by enabling the importation of weapons and other components of

crime, which is further confirmed by Adesola and Akerele (2025), who have directly correlated the alarming spread of banditry to insufficient security of borders.

The Nigeria Customs and Immigration Services have a poorly policed border with Niger, a 1,497-km stretch, and the porosity of these frontiers enhances the infiltration of armed groups of the Central Sahel into Nigeria, including Burkina Faso, Mali, and the Niger (Ojewale, 2024). The discursive conceptualization of the ungoverned spaces lies at the heart of the explanation of co-evolution between border weakness and banditry. Poverty, uncontrolled areas, ineffective security, and poor border control are some of the background factors that precondition armed banditry (Ojo et al., 2023). Most of the attacks in the northwest, where security is minimal, are in rural villages with forests and big forest reserves that have not been affected by Nigerian security agencies are full of banditry (Amali & Buthelezi, 2025). Border governance has been weakened by regional geopolitics. Following a coup that dethroned the Nigerian government on 27 July 2023, cross-border security cooperation collapsed due to ECOWAS sanctions, and the security forces of Nigeria observed a surge in bandit attacks in cross-border regions associated with smuggling more ammunition (Global Initiative, 2023).

Perhaps the most direct facilitator of the long-term deadliness of banditry is the porous border nexus and illegal arms flows. Border porosity, insufficiency in human and technological capacity to monitor, and cross-border operations of armed groups intensify the challenge of arms trafficking; as banditry develops, it is fueled by the fact that it is easy to access illicit arms in the underground economy (Ojewale, 2024).

The Libyan collapse of 2011 left a post-Gaddafi fallout that essentially changed the balance in the region in terms of weapons. Libyan weapons are also transported through Agadez, in Niger, to northern Nigeria and the arms trade is gaining momentum and frequency in Chad, where the arms end up in Nigeria (Amali and Buthelezi, 2025). This illicit trade has centred on Nigeria, which is said to be the centre of the 500 million illegal weapons in West

Africa, with some 6,145,000 small arms estimated to be in the hands of civilians (Security Focus Africa, 2024). The issue is aggravated by state complicity - the Police Force of Nigeria is not able to trace 178,459 firearms, 88,078 of those being AK-47 rifles (Security Focus Africa, 2024).

Feminisation has also been done in the arms supply chain. In the Zamfara State, a number of female gunrunners were caught between December 2022 and February 2023 transporting weapons and ammunition to bandits, and bandits adopted the strategy of using women as arms carriers since they are less likely to be suspected of criminal activity, a tactic that was borrowed by Boko Haram in the northeast (ENACT Africa, 2023). It is also important that the bandit recruitment has a transnational character. In 2016, bandit groups attracted members across neighbouring nations such as Niger, Mali and Chad who were predominantly mostly Tuaregs with connections to Sahelian rebels (Ojewale, 2024). The monopoly on the legitimate use of violence has been successfully lost by the Nigerian state, and international complicity, unsecured borders, and the epidemiological impact of crises in Libya and the Lake Chad Basin all play a role in it (Utibe & Ogundiya, 2024).

The findings also substantiate that the border weakness is not an independent phenomenon but a crossroads with a crisis of socioeconomic and governance malfunctions. Ojewale (2025) mentioned multifaceted poverty, conflict profiles, perceived injustice, border porosity, and arms trafficking as the main causes and facilitators of banditry, and John et al. (2023) also referred to poverty, permeable borders, political interests, and unemployment among the youth. Agu and Ugada (2024) extended this, stating that political power struggles, unemployment, drug abuse, the spread of firearms, and insufficient border security are the factors that contributed to it. All these results prove that banditry flourishes at the border where there is no control, and the level of socioeconomic deprivation is high, and these findings align with what Taylor (2016) and Kitabu (2022) proved in the literature reviewed.

Of particular importance is the governance aspect of findings. Osasona (2023b) explained the current wave of banditry as stemming from the ongoing negligence of rural communities by governance institutions since the restoration of democracy in 1999, which undermined traditional policing and eliminated conflict resolution systems, thereby creating gaps in governance that could be exploited. Kugbayi and Adegami (2023) confirmed this, referring to uncontrolled banditry as a symptom of uncontrolled territories where the state is already dead. The armed bandit groups also showed that they plan their attacks, execute their attacks, and hide in large uncontrolled geographic spaces, which they use to import weapons in neighbouring countries that experience conflicts (Usman and Singh, 2021).

The human toll, as recorded in the findings, is catastrophic and underscores the magnitude of the crisis. According to the findings recorded by Rufa (2021), the total number of armed bandits in Zamfara alone was approximately 10,000 people who killed more than 12,000 people, looted about 250,000 animals, demolished 120 communities, and displaced about 50,000 people, most of whom fled to the Niger Republic between Agu and Ugada (2024) recorded that no less than 8,000 individuals were killed in 2011 to 2019, mainly in Zamfara, and more than 309,000 people displaced throughout the Northwest as of June 2020. Ojo et al. (2023) also reported 8,300 deaths in the region since January 2013 and March 2022, with the highest number of deaths and attacks in Zamfara, Kaduna, Katsina, and Sokoto. Abraham et al. (2024) further noted that from 2011 to 2018 alone, bandit attacks destroyed over 500 villages, 13,000 hectares of land, and the internal displacement of more than 200,000 people.

Table 1: Banditry Activities in North-West Nigeria (2011–2026)

Time Period	Indicator	Data / Figures	Affected States	Source
2013 – March 2022	Recorded banditry incidents	909 incidents (Kaduna – 342; Zamfara – 275; Katsina – 208; Sokoto	Kaduna, Zamfara, Katsina, Sokoto, Kebbi	https://rsisinternational.org/journals/ijrias/articles/weak-border-management-and-banditry-in-the-

		– 54; Kebbi – 14)		northwest-region-nigeria
June 2011 and May 2019	Kidnappings in Zamfara	3,672 kidnappings recorded	Zamfara State	https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2949791425000703
2019 – 2025	Total kidnappings (national, mostly North)	Around 15,000 kidnappings were recorded	Northern Nigeria (mainly North-West)	https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2026/03/05/beyond-christian-genocide-real-roots-criminal-violence-nigeria
Since 2014 – 2025	School kidnappings	Over 1,680 students abducted; 180 schools attacked	Kaduna, Katsina, Zamfara, Kebbi	https://www.eurasiareview.com/05122025-nigeria-emerges-as-a-kidnapping-hotspot-of-the-world-oped
Jan 2024 – Apr 2025	Kidnappings & killings	3,012 kidnappings; 3,584 deaths	North-West region	https://www.eurasiareview.com/05122025-nigeria-emerges-as-a-kidnapping-hotspot-of-the-world-oped
July 2024 – June 2025	Kidnapping trend	4,722 victims in 997 incidents; 762 deaths	North-West (epicentre in Zamfara, Kaduna, Katsina)	https://guardian.ng/news/nigeria/metro/gunmen-kidnap-more-than-30-nigerians-in-borno-kano
2024 – 2025	Banditry impact	At least 4,700 victims; attacks across 70 LGAs	North-West states	https://dailytrust.com/inside-banditry-in-north-west
2024	Abduction surge	An estimated 7,400 people were abducted in one year	North-West Nigeria	https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/violent-criminal-gangs-displace-and-disrupt-north-west-nigeria-enha
2025 (First Half)	Abductions trend	857 people abducted (decline from 1,461 in the previous year)	North-West Nigeria	https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigeria-insurgents-bandits-kill-more-first-half-2025-than-all-last-year-2025-07-08
Jan 2026 (2 weeks)	Short-term incidents	47 kidnapping incidents; 427 abducted	Multiple northern states	https://wanepnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Nigeria-Situation-Report-%E2%80%93-January-1-

				%E2%80%93-15-2026-1.pdf
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Source: Drafted by the Authors from Dailies

Table 1 above provides a summary of the banditry practices in North-West Nigeria between 2011 and 2026, including how the behaviors of banditry changed, intensified, and shifted with time in the location. It demonstrates that banditry, which started as a few cases of cattle stealing and rural banditry, has gradually evolved into a more structured and violent type of armed confrontation.

Table 2: Activities and fatality rate by Banditry

Time Period	Fatalities (Deaths)	Context / Notes	Source
2024	1,585 deaths	Banditry-related killings across Nigeria (baseline before escalation)	https://guardian.ng/news/north-decries-2027-politics-despite-insecurity-4654-deaths-in-2025
2025	2,724 deaths	Banditry became the deadliest driver of violence, with 599 incidents recorded	https://guardian.ng/news/north-decries-2027-politics-despite-insecurity-4654-deaths-in-2025
Jan – June 2025	2,266 deaths	Deaths from banditry and insurgent attacks exceeded total for same period in 2024	https://www.reuters.com/world/af-rica/nigeria-insurgents-bandits-kill-more-first-half-2025-than-all-last-year-2025-07-08
2025 (Projected)	3,980 fatalities	Estimated fatalities from 1,380 violent events, largely driven by banditry in North-West	https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/violent-criminal-gangs-displace-and-disrupt-north-west-nigeria-enha
2025 (Nationwide conflict)	4,654 deaths	Total violent conflict deaths; banditry accounts for a significant share	https://www.modernghana.com/news/1470741/violence-claims-4654-lives-3141-kidnapped-in.html
2026 (Jan, first 2 weeks)	52 deaths (North-West)	The region recorded the highest fatalities compared to other zones in early 2026	https://wanepnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/Nigeria-Situation-Report-%E2%80%93-January-1-%E2%80%93-15-2026-1.pdf

Feb 2026 (41 days)	193 deaths (North-West)	Second-highest regional death toll after the North-East in early 2026	https://www.vanguardngr.com/2026/02/nigeria-violence-claims-1258-lives-in-41-days
2023–2025 (selected states)	10,217+ deaths	Combined killings by bandits and armed groups in Katsina, Zamfara, Sokoto, Kebbi, etc.	https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/nigeria-mounting-death-toll-unchecked-attacks-armed-groups/
May 2023 – April 2024	206,030 deaths (North-West estimate*)	Region recorded highest fatalities nationally (broad insecurity dataset; may include multiple conflict types)	https://en.yenisafak.com/turkiye/d-ata-shows-614937-victims-killed-in-nigeria-from-insecurity-in-1-year-3695997

Source: Drafted by the Authors from Dailies

In Table 2 above, the activities and the rate of fatality of banditry in North-West Nigeria are also presented, which provides the information about the character of attacks and their human cost. Regarding fatality rate, the table depicts an alarming trend of rising casualties with the passage of time, which indicates the rising lethality of the bandit activities.

The humanitarian aspect is not just restricted to the physical displacement. Mbaha et al. (2021) reported that displacement has escalated acute food, water, sanitation, shelter, health, education, and protection needs among the affected people. According to Ojo et al. (2024), educational access was severely hit by the banditry, with the Northwest reporting 3.49 million out-of-school children, the highest nationwide, cutting into the criminal networks, which would be a multiplier effect of further and continued exploitation and enslavement of children across generations. Both state and federal governmental reactions are very insufficient. According to Chris et al. (2021), military bombardments of bandit hideouts, peace negotiations, and amnesty programmes resulted in temporary violence reduction, with the attacks reemerging following the 2019 peace agreement between bandits and governors of Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara. John et al. (2023) note that using force has mostly dispersed bandits to places they had never been to in the past instead of eliminating the threat, and the fact that even the government of

Nigeria has confessed to a lack of modern equipment highlights the structural weakness of its protection efforts. Ezeibe et al. (2022) emphasized the need to respect each other between military activities and international NGO structures in the creation of sustainable counter-extremist programmes, implying that long-term and collaborative solutions are necessary.

In general, the results prove that banditry in Northwest Nigeria is not a spontaneous occurrence but a structurally facilitated crisis that is based on ineffective border control, lack of governance, socioeconomic marginalisation, and the spread of arms. The overlapping of academic findings in various studies is a clear indicator that a sustainable solution includes not only an increase in border security but a complete state presence, rural development, and the coordination of regional cooperation.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The enduring problem of banditry throughout the Northwest of Nigeria directly relates to the border enforcement deficit. Because borders are poorly guarded, criminals have claimed sanctuaries to continue illegal activities while they transport weapons alongside contraband and criminal elements who advance into other countries against security operations. The state's border regulatory capacity weakened due to the primarily deficient infrastructure systems, together with institutional corruption at border control points, as well as the absence of cooperation among security agencies and inadequate community engagement activities. The government's inability to properly maintain its borders has produced a combination of three key negative effects: an upward trend of violent crimes and rural economic disruption, local population displacement, and decreased public confidence in security capabilities. All solutions to stop or eliminate banditry will lead to brief temporary success because the core problems stemming from bad border management remain unaddressed.

The study maintains that banditry control efforts will fail to bear substantial results unless government institutions conduct far-reaching reforms, which include better monitoring

techniques and strengthened guardian networks linking authorities across states, along with strong coordination between different agencies and skilled development of public institutions for role fulfillment. The document supports border security through three-step solutions that merge technological progress with regional defense alliances and community-centered development to tackle border insecurity bases.

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